BERRING SEA 'CONTROVERSY.

-United States certainly could not have got this jurisdictional right from Russia. And if the words, "the ocean,
commonly called the Pacific Ocean" in the treaty of 1825
between Russia and Great Britain included Behring Sea,
as Great Britain would rightly appear to claim that it did,
the contention that Great Britain ever acquiesced in or
conceded Russia's claim of jurisdiction to one hundred
miles from the coast cannot be supported.
In conclusion, it may not be without interest to cite
the position taken by the United States in 1875 in regard to
jurisdiction over large seas and bays. In that year Mr.
FISH, then Secretary of State, wrote to the Russian government as follows:
"There was reason to hope that the practice which
formerly prevailed with powerful nations of regarding seas
and bays usually of large extent near their coast, as closed
to any foreign commerce or fishery not specially licensed by
them, was, without exception, a pretension of the past,
and that no nation would claim exemption from the general
rule of public law which limits its maritime jurisdiction to
a marine league from its coasts."'
New York, October20, 1892.

SUNDAY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES.
By JAms T. RINGGOLD, EsP.

THE constitutionality and the construction of "Sunday
laws" have been considered by the courts of this country
in nearly one thousand cases. So far as the mere weight
of authority can settle anything, it is settled that such laws
are valid tinder the Federal Constitution, and under the
constitution of every State in which their validity has been
contested.
- Wharton, Digest I, io6.
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There are traces of a union of Church and State elsewhere in the body of American law (as in statutes against
blasphemy, qualifications required of witnesses, etc.), but
Sunday laws are by far the most conspicuous portion of
this inheritance of ours from the English form of government.
To say that Sunday laws represent a union of Church
and State, and that the weight of authority sustains such laws
in the United States may sound to some like an impeachment of our judiciary, because the absolute separation of
the two is commonly regarded as an axiom of American
politics. Yet both propositions are demonstrable.
The second, of course, is established by a mere counting of the cases. The reading of them is enough to establish the first. Occasionally an objection is made to Sunday
laws as interfering with the rights of property, etc. But
in every case their constitutionality has been assailed, and
in most cases it has been exclusilely assailed on the ground
that they are infringements of religious liberty. And not
one of the judges who have sustained them on other than
religious grounds has ever ventured the assertion that they
are passed, or that their enforcement is asked for, on any
other ground than these. And a statute which is passed
or the enforcement of which is asked for on religious
gounds represents a union of Church and State, bro tanto,
no matter what other grounds the courts may allege for
its enforcement.
It is difficult to formulate a general statement in
American constitutional law, outside of the Federal system,
because the language of the State constitutions differs
widely, and the language of the statutes on any particular
[NOm.-In a book entitled "Sunday: Legal Aspects of the First Day of the Week,"

r

by the present writer (Jersey City: Frederick D. Linn & Co.), an effort has been made
to collect and classify all the cases of importance on the subject which have been decided in zgland and America to date (i8i). In the following article, the intention
Is to cover the entire ground as thoroughly as may be, but it has not been deemed
necessary to cite many cases which simply go to the same point. Under each branch
of the discussion the aim is to present a typical case, the ruling or didum of which fairly

represents the average spirit of the cases of its class. So far as the writer knows, no.
argument has yet been presented in favor of Sunday laws which is not noticed here,
and it has been his conscientious endeavor to give them all their best and strongest
expression.]
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subject is equally at variance. The force of this proposition is lessened, but it is by no means nullified by the
interesting fact discovered and noted by Mr. STIMSON (see
the Preface to his invaluable "American Statute Law")
that there are in the Union "streams of legislation," that
is to say, groups of States (of which he finds three, with
some anomalies) whose legislation follows a uniform line,
different from that followed by States of another group.
One of Mr. STIMSON'S "streams of legislation" is followed by twenty-nine States, whose constitutions declare
in substance that no "preference" shall be given by law
to one religious sect over another. If we admit that there
is a like intent inspiring the somewhat diversified phraseology of the provisions for "religious equality," etc. in
States outside of this stream-as we must admit, unless we
are prepared to admit that a union of Church and State may
be effected in such States-then we may frame this general
statement regarding Sunday laws, as the result of the decisions to date: It is concluded that they would be invalid
in any State, if they gave a "preference " to one religion
over another, and it is denied that they give any such
preference.
The constitutionality of a statute may be regarded from
two standpoints-that of its design, and that of its effect.
"Design" here must not be confounded with "motive."
The legislature may be influenced by corrupt motives in the
accomplishment of a design within its constitutional authority. Nothing is better settled than that upon this consideration the courts will never enter.' But suppose the legislature, by no means corruptly, but in all honesty and sincerity
aims at the accomplishment of a design which it is forbidden
by the Constitution to accomplish. And let us strengthen
the case by assuming that if the statute passed with such an
aim is sustained by the courts, the result will be the accomplishment of the unconstitutional design. Are the courts
justified in sustaining the statute merely because some other
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wal., 5o6, 514; Doyle v. Continental Ins.
Co., 94 U. S., 535.
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purpose is incidentally effected, at which the legislature
might constitutionally have aimed?
Now religion concerns itself with two things, belief
and conduct, and the distinction between one religion and
another is two-fold-one requires a certain belief and certain conduct which the other forbids or does not require.
Hence, it is not enough to say concerning the Sunday law:
"!what religion or religious creed or dogma is inculcated in
that statute? Or what religion is prohibited? * * *
Does it ask that any citizen shall believe in the God of the
Bible or its teachings, or the doctrines of the Bible, the
Koran or of Confucius, or the Talmud, or the Old or New
Testament? Certainly not" '-because, though no religious creed or dogma be inculcated, yet a "preference" may
be given by a statute to one religion over another by the
mere regulation of conduct. And this preference is given
whenever conduct is regulated on religious grounds, according to the special prescription of any religious sect, or when
the deslgn of a statute is to punish an offence against religion as such. That Sunday laws do embody the prescription of a certain sect for the "observance" of that day is
indisputable. Are they passed on religious grounds? Are
they designed to punish offences against religion as such?
Blackstone classifies them with tie provisions against "apostasy," "heresy," "non-conformity," and the like, all of
which things he calls "Offences against God and religion.' ' 2
This classification is followed in the "Codes" and
Digests of Statutes of nearly every State and Territory in
the Union. In dealing with the Sunday laws the courts
uniformly allude to them as provisions against "profanation" or "desecration."'
But only a sacred thing can be
profaned or desecrated; and whether a thing be sacred or
not is altogether a matter of religion. So that to punish
I Sundstrom's Case, 25 Tex. App., 133. See also Specht's Case, 8
Pa. St., 325.
2Bk.
IV., ch. 4.
' "e. g." Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb., 425; Lindenmuller's Case, 33
Barb., 548; Nenendorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y., 557; Nesbit's Case, 34 Pa.,
86.

SUNDAY

LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES.

profanation or desecration is to punish an offence against
religion as such.

That Sunday laws are passed on religious grounds is
perfectly well known to every reasonable person. Mr.
TIEDEMAIN correctly says "The most common form of legal
interference in matters of religion is that which requires
the observance of Sunday as a holy day. In these days the
legal requirements do not usually extend beyond the compulsory cessation of labor, the maintenance of quiet upon
the streets and the closing of all places of amusements;
but the public spirit which calls for the compulsory observance of these regulations is the same which in the colonial
days of New Englandimposed a fine for an unexcused absence from Divine worship. Although other reasons have

been assigned for the State regulation of the observance of
Sunday in order to escape the constitutional objections that
can be raised against it if it takes the form of a religious
institution, those who are most active in securing the enforcement of the Sunday laws do so because of the religious
character of the day, and not for any economical reason.

..

The effectiveness of the laws is measured by the in-

fluence of/he Christian idea of Sunday as a religiousins/ilu-

tion."

So says Judge

COOLEY

"It is clear that these laws.

are supportable on authority no/wi/hsazding /he inconvenience which they occasion to those whose religious sentiments
do no/ recognize the sacred charac/erof the first day of the

week. 1 2 And what is this but saying, and saying with perfect correctness that Sunday laws simply embody the views
of those who do recognize the "sacred" character of the
first day of the week, and are therefore passed on religious
grounds alone? "The Jew" says Judge COOLEY in a previous paragraph "may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his religion, and, by forcing him to keep

a second Sabbath in each week unjustly, though by indiscretion, punishes him for his belief." Why "plausibly ?"
'Limitations of Police Power, pp. 175-6, see 76.
those of the present writer, here and in other citations.

The italics are

-Constitutional Limitations, p. 3 85, ch. xiii (Ed. 189o).
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Is not the discrimination perfectly plain? May it not be
conclusively urged?
But the fact is clear enough without authority that Sunday laws embody a religious dogma, and that they constrain
the citizen on religious grounds alone. There are two sides,
again, to this religious character of Sunday laws-the side
of the constrainer and the side of the constrained. So far
as the latter is concerned, the real spirit of such legislation
has been frankly stated by a North Carolina Judge who
says that work on Sunday "offends us not so much because
it disturbs us in practicing for ourselves the religious duties
or enjoying the salutary repose or recreation of that day as
that it isin itself a breach of God's law and a violation of
the farty's own religiousduty." 1 A plainer truth, one more
.clearly and fully appreciated by Sunday law advocates,
while they seek to ignore and even deny it, was -never
printed. So far, then, as the constrained are concerned,
the object of Sunday laws is to compel them to perforni a
religious duty, and to punish an offence against religion as
such. And as this religious duty is exacted by some
religious communions and not by all, the "preference"
among religions is established.
In strict accordance with this view are the New Hampshire decisions on the point of what constitutes a "disturbance" of one person by another on Sunday. At first
sight it might seem unobjectionable to provide that no work
should be done on Sunday "to the disturbance of others,"
as is done in New Hampshire. But the value of the qualification, if it had any, is destroyed by the judicial construction. The Court has taken the North Carolina view that
the statute was, intended to prevent "acts calculated to
.tunz the attention of those piresent from their appfropriate
tekgious duties to matters of more worldly concern," 2 and
hence it is settled in that State that business, however
quietly conducted on Sunday, "disturbs" those engaged
in it, and that a man is "disturbed," though he be willing
Wiflliam's Case, 4 Sec. 4oo.
George v. George, 47 N. H.,

27.
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and even anxious to do business on Sunday, by the doing
of it, or by any act, however voluntary, which lends to distract him fi-om religious observances." '
There is no mitigation, then, of Sunday law rigor in
the use of the proviso about disturbance. Nor is the New
Hampslire Court to be reproached for pandering to the
spirit of Puritanism in construing its law, proviso and all,
as intended to apply to individual conduct, without any
reference whatever to its actual effect on others. How the
words "to the disturbance of others" came to be inserted
in the New Hampshire statute it may not be practicable to
ascertain; but there can be no doubt that they would have
been promptly stricken out if it had been suggested to the
framers of that statute that such words might be taken to
mean that a man might do as he pleased on Sunday, if he
only did it quietly. There is no doubt that the Court, as
in duty bound, gave effect to the legislative intent in its
view of the objects of the Sunday law.
There are other considerations which may be noted
here in connection with the subject of "disturbance."
Even if the New Hampshire Court were wrong, and the
word was meant to apply to others than the doer of the
act in question, there would be no saving efficacy in the
phrase. We are at once confronted with the difficultywho is to determine whether or not one man is disturbed on
Sunday by the act of another? If the first man's assertion
is to be taken as conclusive on the subject, of course there
is no use in having such words in the statute. But when we
admit that the question of disturbance vel non is one for
judicial determination in any given case, we see at once
that this qualification involves a fatal confession of the
nature and purpose of all Sunday laws. For, without any
statutes, wherever the common law, or any other logical
system of jurisprudence prevails, that is, among any civilized people, work which "disturbs" others is unlawful at
all times. To "disturb," in the eye of the law, is to inSee Varney v. French, 19 N. H.,
Id., 248.
47

223;

Thompson v. Williams, 58
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fringe on some right or privilege which it creates or recognizes. When, therefore, the law recognizes a privilege as
existing on Sunday which exists on no other day, and considers that acts will amount to a "disturbance" of others
on Sunday which will not amount to such disturbance on
any other day, we must ask ourselves what this special
privilegeof Sunday is, which is thus honored. It cannot
be the right "peaceably to assemble." In every American
constitution this right is guaranteed expressly or impliedly,
hnd it exists at all times. Nor does it matter what the purpose of assembling may be, unless it be tainted with treason.
People may assemble at any hour of the day or night, and
talk religion or infidelity, or politics or dress reform, and if
anybody disturbs their assembly, the police will lock him
up. The right of assembly and the question of what constitutes a disturbance of or an infringement of that right
does not in the smallest degree depend on the object of the
assembly, as religious or otherwise, nor does it depend in
the smallest degree on the time of the assembly, as on
Sunday or Monday. The standard of the law, its test of
the right and its violation is the same for all assemblies and
all periods. What special "right" is it, then, which is
disturbed on Sunday by certain acts which disturb no rights
on any other day? Let a Pennsylvania Court answer for
us: "There are other rights intimately associated with
rights of conscience which are worth preserving. The right
to reara family with a becoming regardfor the institutions
of Christianity, and without compelling them to witness
hourly infractions of one of its fundamental laws" '-that

is to say, Sunday statutes are passed to compel one man to
observe a "fundamental law" of Christianity for the benefit of another man's children. But a statute passed for
the purpose of enforcing a law, fundamental or otherwise,
of any particular religion gives a "preference" to that religion, unless an equal privilege be accorded to a like law of
every other religion.
These authorities are adduced not in order to establish
I Johnston's Case, 22 Pa., o2.
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the proposition that Sunday laws embody a preference of
one religion over another, but merely, as is proper in an
article written for a law magazine, to show that this fact
has, at least in some cases, been frankly recognized by the
courts. It would be equally a fact if all the courts in the
country denied it. All the decisions of all the courts
cannot make black white. The decision of a court may
settle whether or not a Sunday law is enforceable, but it
can have no effect upon the question of the origin, or the
inspiring motive of such legislation. So the more numerous decisions (more numerous especially among the later
cases) which take what is known as the "secular view" of
Sunday laws are of no account whatever as evidence of the
correctness of that view, because this is a question not of
law at all, but of historic fact.
It has been said that the law will prevent the disturbance of a meeting without regard to its character as religious or otherwise. Like many other things in law, this disregard results from its refusal to attempt impossibilities. The
law has no test whereby to determine whether a meeting is
religious or not. This being claimed as the character of a
spiritualist camp-meeting in a Sunday law case, the Court
left the point to the jury.' The "unseemliness" of controversies over such a point, the impossibility of settling
any rule for deciding them, the purely religious nature of
the dispute are self evident. It is a mere evasion to leave
such a question to a jury. An American jury has no
authority to decide any question of which American law
can take no cognizance. Neither jury nor judge can decide
in this country the right and title of any system of belief to
be called religious. It is a usurpation for a jury to render
a verdict on such a question. It is quite as much a usurpation for a judge to render and enforce a judgment on such
a verdict by a jury of others as it would be for him to do
so after sitting as a jury himself.
But even were it practicable for American law to discriminate between a religious assembly and any other in
I Feital v.

Middlesex R.R., lO9 Mass., 398.
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the protection afforded against disturbance, no reason what-ever exists for attempting such a discrimination. The simple fact is-though, like many other facts, it is constantly
"blinked" in the discussion of this subject that a religious assembly is disturbed by just precisely the same acts
which would disturb any other assembly, and by no other
acts whatever. From this point of view all sorts and conditions of men are alike. The orderly and regular conduct
of a caucus and a church service, the ability of those present to keep abreast of what is going on, and to influence
others-these things require precisely the same police conditions in the one case as in the other. This, again, is not
matter of law, but fact. The Seventh Day Adventists,
that remarkable people whose headquarters are at Battle
Creek in Michigan, lately protested before Congress through
their clear-headed and eloquent representative, Mr. ALONZO
T. JONES, against the attempt of the Women's Christian
Temperance Union to have a Federal Sunday law enacted.
Mr. JONES consistently-he and his people are nothing if
not consistent to the core-disclaimed any desire to have
his "seventh day'" substituted for Sunday, declaring, with
perfect correctness, that all such legislation involved that
union of Church and State which his organization is pledged
to oppose -with unrelenting hostility. But he also laid special stress on the fact that his brethren were not disturbed
in any manner whatever in their "seventh day" observances by other people's pursuit of their regular occupations
-and therefore they did not need the law, even if they felt
it right to ask its aid, in order to enable them to observe
their day according to their wish. We have among us
Jews and Seventh Day Baptists, and their experience is the
same-that no "Sunday law" is needed to protect them
in the full enjoyment of their Scriptural Sabbath. We have
also Roman Catholics and Episcopalians who observe such
"fia4 and feasts as Lent, Christmas, Good Friday, "saints
days,I etc., by holding religious assemblies. Not one of
them has ever complained that these assemblies are in any
wise disturbed by the steady course of the world's daily
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work and traffic. The case is still stronger when we come
to those who are specially interested in Sunday laws, to
whose agency such laws and their spasmodic enforcement
are due. These may be broadly grouped as "Evangelicals." Such persons make a regular practice of holding
"prayer-meetings" on week-days. The claim has never
been advanced that these assemblies are disturbed by the
ordinary labor of those who fail to attend them. So, also,
with the great "revivals" to which some of them are addicted. Day after day, every day and night in the week,
they assemble for religious purposes on such occasions. It
has never been remarked that the week-day services are
disturbed any more than those held on Sunday-that they
are any less satisfactory to those who conduct them, or less
profitable in the ratio of " conversions" to attendance.
So that we see our proposition that nothing can disturb a religious meeting which does nok disturb any other
kind of meeting proven by daily experience of the life
around us. And we see further that, as the disturbance of
religious meetings at any time will be prevented by the
"C
police-power" of the State, no "Sunday law " is needed
to prevent such disturbance. And we are thus brought
face to face with the truth of the matter-namely, that the
only disturbance involved in Sunday work is the disturbance of one man's right to constrain another to a certain
line of conduct as a religious duty; and that Sunday laws
are therefore passed with a religious purpose, and designed
to punish offences against religion as such, and so constitute a " preference" by the state of one religion over another.
As this true character of Sunday laws becomes more
and more evident to the American people, the demand for
their repeal grows stronger and stronger. Nor is this demand to be thwarted by quibbling over what constitutes
a union of Church and State. Like other unions, this
may be complete or partial. The only instance in history
of a complete union of the two, or an absolute identity of
Church and State was the polity of the Hebrews in Pales-
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tine.1 But in every civilized country the union exists to
a greater or less extent. It was to guard against it that all
such provisions as those forbidding a preference among religions have been inserted in the American Constitutions.
It exists in the very teeth of such provisions wherever a
Sunday law is found.
The advocates of these laws appreciate their danger,
and hence we see in some later cases an invention known as
"the holiday theory" of Sunday laws brought to the
rescue of a failing cause. Said an Arkansas judge :" The
power of the legislature to select a day as a holiday is everywhere conceded. The State from the beginning ,has appropriated Sunday as such.'
And he added that the same
'principle which upholds the right of the State to close its
offices on certain days authorizes it "to prescribe a penalty
for the violation of the Sunday law." The extract ante from
Mr. TIEDEMAN sufficiently refutes this parallel so far as it
affects the question of the origin and. purpose of Sunday
laws. Its fallacy is equally apparent from their contents.
Whoever heard of such a thing as a compulsory holiday?
Whoever heard of a statute which established a public
holiday and closed all. places of public amusement, and
provided a penalty for those who should undertake to
amuse themselves in private upon the day in question?
Desperately as some are clinging to this last spar, it must
share the fate of the other wrecked arguments by which it
is sought to support Sunday laws on constitutional grounds.
There are cases, however, which take "a secular
view" of such legislation without going so far as to claim
that it makes a holiday of Sunday. According to these
'! the evident object of the statute was to prevent the day
from being employed in servile work, which is exhausting
to the body, or in merely idle pastime, subversive of that
order, thrift and economy which is necessary. to the preservation of society."'
I See Milman's History of the Jews.
2

Scale's Case, 47 Ark., 476.

3

Landersv. R. R., 12 Abb. Pa. (N. S.), 338.
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Let us consider these clauses separately. Has it ever
been claimed that it is within the power of an American
legislature to compel a man to abstain from earning his living by "servile labor," because the legislature in its wisdom,
considers such labor as "exhausting to the body "-ever
claimed, that is, except in connection with Sunday laws?
Who made of the legislature a physician to order off a man
from any labor, "servile" or otherwise, because of its effect
upon his body? Is not the liberty of labor at will part of
the inheritance of every citizen of a free country which he
"comes into" when he attains his majority? The interference with labor on account of its "exhausting the body"
is parental, and can never be justified under any other than
a parental government. So that if this interference were
necessary or even desirable, it would not be practicable in
any State whose constitution contains a guaranty of personal liberty. As a matter of fact, however, it is neither
necessary nor 'desirable, though many of the cases assume
that it is -both, and Sunday law advocates of every kind are
prone to start with the statement, as if it were an axiom of
thought that "we are so constituted physically that the
precise portion of time indicated by the Decalogue must be
observed as a day of rest and relaxation, and nature, in the
punishment inflicted for a violation of our physical laws
adds her sanction to the positive law promulgated at
Sinai."' Yet this statement) so often made in substance on
the Bench and elsewhere in order to justify Sunday laws, is
absolutely without any foundation whatever, and is absurd
on its face and is contradicted by the most familiar facts.
It is absurd on its face. The amount of rest required and
the advisable periodicity of it is the result of three factors
-the man, his work, and his environment; and, as the first
of these is never the same in any two instances the result is
never the same. To attempt to lay down a uniform rule on
this subject is as preposterous as it would be to require
everybody to eat the same amount and the same kind of
food every day. What is said above about the punishments
I Lindenmaller's

Case, 33 Barb., 548.
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of "nature" applies here as it was not intended to apply.
The whole matter belongs to her domain and is subject to
her laws alone. The time for rest is proclaimed by her
-when she makes a man tired, and his punishment may
safely be left in her hands, if he disobeys her mandate to
rest.
Of course there are no facts adducible which even
appear to sustain so monstrous a proposition as that everybody always needs the same amount of rest at the same
interval. The facts are all the other way. Preachers who
work hard all the time, and do double work on Sundays;
doctors who 'can never rest at any stated interval; lawyers,
journalists and others, who frequently work day in and day
out for months without a holiday-all these compare favorably for robustness and longevity, with that conscientious
Sunday rester, the farmuer. Races of men, as the Greeks
and Romans of-old, the Chinese, Japanese, etc., to whom
the idea of resting at stated intervals never occurred, yet
have survived and flourished. Not long ago the Methodist
Bishop, ANDREWS, gave it out as "something he could not
understand" that they had no Sabbath in China, and yet
the laboring men lived to old age! Of course the good
Bishop shut his eyes at home, 'and opened them in China.
He was under that delusion so common with men of his
calling that'the existence of a law is proof of its enforcement. He did not know or chose to. ignore the fact that
thousands of his fellow-Americans who know no Sabbath
are as' healthy, long lived and at least as active in the
world's work as the strictest Sabbatarian in his communion.
Besides negativing the arguments by which Sunday
laws have been defended, and calling attention to the
positive -objection to them as the embodiment of a union of
Church and State; it may be well to point out another undesirable characteristic of such legislation. Although Sunday laws do 'not make the day a holiday, yet they have this
in common with laws establishing holidays-that they tend
to encourage among the people the conceptidn that idleness is a good thing in itself, to be sought for its own sake,
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and that the State is conferring a great boon upon them by
allowing them the opportunity of indulging in it. No more
immoral or dangerous doctrine could be preached by any
legislation than this. Rest is necessary; but its value lies
not in itself; it is valuable only in so far as it fits us better
for our work. Public holidays may have a historical value;
that their general effect on the manners of the mass is demoralizing few will deny. Leisure is a dangerous possession in the hands of the wisest and best. Let the managers
of factories, the heads of schools and the like be heard to
testify to the slipshod character of "Blue Monday's" work,
and we shall appreciate the profundity of that unknown
philosopher who gave it as his decided conviction that the
crying need of this country is not more holidays, but more
days to get over them.
Industry is a virtue; idleness is a vice. But our Sunday laws make a complete topsy-turvification of this fundamental principle of morals for fifty-two days in the year.
On these days, industry is branded as a crime, and idleness
is required as a condition of good citizenship. The immoral
lesson thus taught bears its fruit in the constant demand
for more public holidays, and for limiting the hours of work
by the State and other laws which are strangely misnamed
as "labor legislation," being in reality, like the Sunday
laws, legislation for the promotion of idleness. And thus
we have another illustration of the great principle, and the
evil tree of Sunday law brings forth after its kind.
The survey of the subject would not be complete without some reference to the savings of "necessity," and
"charity," which are made in all Sunday laws.
The very presence of the word "charity" is sufficient
to betray the true nature of these laws as religious dogmas
enacted -into statutes. The interpretation of the word has,
of course, to be made accordingly. And hence it is correctly said that "the means which long established and common usage of religious congregationsshow to be reasonably
necessary to advance the cause of religion may be deemed
works of charity.'
But, apart from its fatal disclosure of

I Dale

v. Knapp, 98 Pa., 389.
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the religious character of the statute, the presence of this
word, like that of "necessity," introduces a degree of
uncertainty as to the application of the law which it is
safe to say would cause the courts to hold it void altogether if it were anything else but a Sunday law. Well
has a learned judge of Vermont observed, "The statute
excepts all acts of necessity and charity. These are lawful,
and who is to judge what are such? If the jury, it will
depend on the religious opinions of each jury, and of course
be pregnant with the utmost uncertainty. If the Court, as
matter of law, then it will nearly convert a bench of laymen
into an ecclesiasticalcouncil, for ' necessity' and charity in
connection with the Sabbath must very much defiend upfon the
creed or religious belief of the individual to whom the question is submitted. * * * How ungraciousfor a court
to mark the law upon this duty for all denominations to be
governed by and with judges usually belonging to different
religious societies. It would be like a synod comfiosed of the
dignitariesof several sects."' The uncertainty involved in

the use of the word "charity," apart from the religious
aspect of the question, may be illustrated by the preceding
case. ' This held that a contract of subscription towards
the erection of a church was valid as an act of charity. If
so, on what ground is the actual building of the church on
Sunday unlawful? Or the quarrying of the stone for its
walls, or the dressing of timber for its interior? In a word,
where are we to stop in the degree of closeness of connection between the act in question and ' the advancement of
the cause of religion?' It does not seem possible that the
subtlest judicial ingenuity will succeed any better in the
future than it has in the past, in affording a satisfactory
answer to this question.
But if an impenetrable cloud is cast over the force and
application of the Sunday law by the presence of this word
"charity," on what a bottomless, trackless sea are we
launched by the use of that other word "necessity 1" The
I Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt., 236.
2
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tossings and flounderings, the hopeless "seeking after a
sign," the vain beating toward a harbor which does not
exist which we find in the cases on this subject are really
painful to a sensitive mind. Among others, the eminent
Judge and Senator THURMAN, of Ohio, once wrestled with
this subject in a long opinion.' But the outcome of it all
is that there is no way of defining "necessity," though
-the learned judge does not say this in so many words. In
the first place, we do not know whether necessity is a question of law or of fact, or of both combined. 2 And secondly,
it is unsettled whether the necessity must be that of the
doer of the act or whether it is sufficient if his doing of it
-was a necessity to somebddy else.'
It is, however, when we leave these preliminary questions and come to consider the nature of this necessity of
-which we are to determine the existence or non-existence
in any given case-when we study the thing in ilsel/;
.as some philosophers say, that we most fully appreciate
the hopelessness of interpreting or applying a Sunday
law with any degree of uniformity or fairness. Only a
few points need be mentioned to vindicate this position.
We are told that the necessity need not be "absolute,"'
.yet it must be "imperious," and mere "convenienceI is
-not enough;' that it varies with the individual, so that a
Tich man might be punishable for working on Sunday to
save his property from destruction, while a poor man would
not be,7 and also with "the exigencies of trade;" 8 and so
See McGutrick v. Mason, 4 0., 566.
2 Itis one of fact in Indiana, Edgerton's Case, 68 Ind., 588. of law in
Vermont, Lyon v. Strong, I Vt., 219; and of law and fact in Alabama.
Hooper v. Edwards, 25 Ala., 528.
3 In England, a barber is not excused by the fact that his Sunday
'shaving was a necessity for his customer. Phillips v. Tuness, 4 CI. & F.,
234. But it is said that here the apothecary is justified in selling a medicine which is a necessity to the sick. L. & N. 1R. R.'s Case, 89 Ind.,
291.

'4 lagg v. Millbury, 4 Cush., 243.
5 Ohmer's case, 34 Mo. App., iiS.
6Allen v. Duffie, 43 Mich., i.
'7See Whitcomb v. Gilman, 35 Vt., 297.
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